Abstract. Passwords are ubiquitous and most commonly used to authenticate users when logging into online services. Using high entropy passwords is critical to prevent unauthorized access and password policies emerged to enforce this requirement on passwords. However, with current methods of password storage, poor practices and server breaches have leaked many passwords to the public. To protect one's sensitive information in case of such events, passwords should be hidden from servers. Verifier-based password authenticated key exchange, proposed by Bellovin and Merrit (IEEE S&P, 1992), allows authenticated secure channels to be established with a hash of a password (verifier). Unfortunately, this restricts password policies as passwords cannot be checked from their verifier. To address this issue, Kiefer and Manulis (ESORICS 2014) proposed zero-knowledge password policy check (ZKPPC). A ZKPPC protocol allows users to prove in zero knowledge that a hash of the user's password satisfies the password policy required by the server. Unfortunately, their proposal is not quantum resistant with the use of discrete logarithm-based cryptographic tools and there are currently no other viable alternatives. In this work, we construct the first post-quantum ZKPPC using lattice-based tools. To this end, we introduce a new randomised password hashing scheme for ASCII-based passwords and design an accompanying zero-knowledge protocol for policy compliance. Interestingly, our proposal does not follow the framework established by Kiefer and Manulis and offers an alternate construction without homomorphic commitments. Although our protocol is not ready to be used in practice, we think it is an important first step towards a quantum-resistant privacy-preserving password-based authentication and key exchange system.
Introduction
One of the most common methods of user authentication is passwords when logging in to online services. So, it is very important that passwords in use have sufficient entropy and hard to guess for security. Password policies was introduced to guide users into choosing suitable passwords that are harder to guess. Ur et al. [51] discovered that users are more likely to choose easily guessable passwords in the absence of a password policy. Examining the password policies of over 70 web-sites, Florêncio and Herley [18] found that most require passwords with characters from at least one of four sets, digits, symbols, lowercase and uppercase letters and a minimum password length. Hence, it is reasonable to focus on password policies with a minimum password length, sets of valid characters and maybe constraints on the diversity of characters used.
Even with strong passwords and good policies, nothing can prevent leaks if servers do not properly store passwords. Improperly stored passwords can cause serious problems, as seen by hacks on LinkedIn [20] and Yahoo [47] and the web-site "Have I Been Pwned?" [26] . Sadly, such poor practices are not uncommon: many popular web-sites were discovered by Baumann et al. [4] to store password information in plaintext.
If servers cannot be trusted, then no password information should be stored there at all. Thus, protocols that do not require storing secret user information at external servers become necessary. However, even with secret passwords, password policies are important to enforce a base level of security against dictionary attacks, leaving a dilemma: how do users prove compliance of their password without revealing anything?
Kiefer and Manulis [31] showed how to address this problem with zero knowledge password policy check (ZKPPC). It enables blind registration: users register a password with a server and prove password policy conformance without revealing anything about their passwords, thereby solving the dilemma. With ZKPPC, some randomised password verification information is stored at the server and it does not leak information about the password, protecting against server compromises. Furthermore, ZKPPC allows a user to prove, without revealing any information, that the password conforms to the server's policy. Blind registration can be coupled with a verifier-based password-based authenticated key exchange (VPAKE) protocol to achieve a complete system for privacy-preserving password-based registration, authentication and key exchange. Password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) [6, 5, 21, 28, 15, 8] is a protocol that allows users to simultaneously authenticate themselves using passwords and perform key exchange. However, these protocols store passwords on the server and thus, users have to trust the security of the server's password storage and may be vulnerable to password leakages in the event of server compromise. Verifier-based PAKE [7, 5, 22, 11] extends PAKE to limit the damage caused by information leakage by storing a verifier instead. Verifiers are a means to check that users supplied the correct passwords and are usually hash values of passwords with a salt, which makes it hard to extract the passwords from verifiers.
A ZKPPC protocol allows users to prove that their password, committed in the verifier, satisfies some password policy. VPAKE can then be used to securely authenticate and establish keys whenever communication is required. Together, the password is never revealed, greatly increasing the user security over current standards. Passwords are harder to guess and no longer easily compromised by server breaches.
Kiefer and Manulis [31] proposed a generic construction of ZKPPC using homomorphic commitments and set membership proofs. In the same work, a concrete ZKPPC protocol was constructed using Pedersen commitments [45] , whose security is based on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. As such, it is vulnerable to attacks from quantum adversaries due to Shor's algorithm [49] which solves the discrete logarithm problem in quantum polynomial time. With NIST issuing a call for proposals to standardize quantum resistant cryptography [44] , it is clear that we need to prepare cryptographic schemes and protocols that are quantum resistant, in case a sufficiently powerful quantum computer is realized. As there is currently no proposal of ZKPPC protocol that has the potential to be quantum resistant, it is an interesting open problem to construct one.
OUR CONTRIBUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES. In this work, inspired by the attractiveness of ZKPPC protocols and the emergence of lattice-based cryptography as a strong quantum resistant candidate, we aim to construct a ZKPPC protocol from lattices. Our contribution is two-fold. We first design a randomised password hashing scheme based on the hardness of the Short Integer Solution (SIS) problem. We then construct a SIS-based statistical zero-knowledge argument of knowledge, which allows the client to convince the server that his secret password, committed in a given hash value, satisfies the server's policy. This yields the first ZKPPC protocol that still resists against quantum computers.
Our first technical challenge is to derive a password encoding mechanism that operates securely and interacts smoothly with available lattice-based cryptographic tools. In the discrete log setting considered in [31] , passwords are mapped to large integers and then encoded as elements in a group of large order. Unfortunately, this does not translate well to the lattice setting as working with large-norm objects usually makes the construction less secure and less efficient. Therefore, a different method, which encodes passwords as small-norm objects, is desirable. To this end, we define a password encoding mechanism, that maps a password consisting of t characters to a binary vector of length 8t, where each of the t blocks is the 8-bit representation of the ASCII value of the corresponding password character. To increase its entropy, we further shuffle the arrangement of those blocks using a random permutation, and then commit to the permuted vector as well as a binary encoding of the permutation via the SIS-based commitment scheme proposed by Kawachi, Tanaka and Xagawa [29] . This commitment value is then viewed as the randomised hash value of the password.
The next technical challenge is to prove in zero-knowledge that the committed password satisfies a policy of the form f = (k D , k U , k L , k S ), n min , n max , which demands that the password have length at least n min and at most n max , and contain at least k D digits, k S symbols, k L lower-case and k U upper-case letters. To this end, we will have to prove, for instance, that a committed length-8 block-vector belongs to the set of vectors encoding all 10 digits. We thus need a lattice-based sub-protocol for proving set membership. In the lattice-based world, a set membership argument system with logarithmic complexity in the cardinality of the set was proposed in [36] , exploiting Stern-like protocols [50] and Merkle hash trees. However, the asymptotic efficiency does not come to the front when the underlying set has small, constant size. Here, we employ a different approach, which has linear complexity but is technically simpler and practically more efficient, based on the extend-then-permute technique for Stern's protocol, suggested by Ling et al. [37] . Finally, we use a general framework for Stern-like protocols, put forward by Libert et al. [34] , to combine all of our sub-protocols for set membership and obtain a ZKPPC protocol.
From a practical point of view, our lattice-based ZKPPC protocol is not yet ready to be used: for a typical setting of parameters, an execution with soundness error 2 −30 has communication cost around 900 KB. We, however, believe that there are much room for improvement and view this work as the first step in designing post-quantum privacy-preserving password-based authentication and key exchange systems.
RELATED WORK. The only construction of ZKPPC was proposed by Kiefer and Manulis [31] using Pedersen commitments [45] and a randomised password hashing scheme introduced in the same work. It commits each character individually and uses set membership proofs to prove compliance of the entire password to a password policy. The password hash is the sum of the committed characters and thus is linked to the set membership proofs through the homomorphic property of the commitments used. As mentioned previously, their protocol is vulnerable to quantum adversaries and greater diversity is desirable.
To improve the efficiency of secure password registration for VPAKE [32] and two server PAKE [33] , Kiefer and Manulis proposed blind password registration (BPR), a new class of cryptographic protocols that prevent password leakage from the server. Using techinques introduced in [31] , Kiefer and Manulis used an efficient shuffling proof from [19] to achieve O(1) number of set membership proofs instead of O(n max ) in ZKPPC. However, the security model considered for BPR is only suitable for honest but curious participants. The security of ZKPPC is defined to prevent malicious users from registering bad passwords that do not conform to the given password policy. Malicious servers also do not gain any information on the registered password from running the ZKPPC protocol. Overall, the security model of BPR is weaker than the capabilities of ZKPPC and available instantiations are not resistant to quantum adversaries.
An alternate approach using symmetric key primitives, secure set-based policy checking (SPC), to check password policy was proposed in [17] . Policies are represented set-theoretically as monotone access structures and are mapped to linear secret sharing schemes (LSSS). Then, checking policy compliance corresponds to verifying whether some set is in the access structure, i.e. if the set of shares can reconstruct the secret in the LSSS. To obtain a privacy-preserving protocol for SPC, the oblivious bloom intersection (OBI) from [16] is used. The server constructs an LSSS that only users who fulfil the policy can obtain the right shares from the OBI and recover the secret. Knowledge of the secret is proved with a hash of the secret with the transcript of the protocol execution and identities of the two parties, tying the protocol to the proof of knowledge. In the proposed SPC protocol, the one-more-RSA assumption is used to guarantee that the password registration protocol is sound when used by a malicious client. Thus, in the presence of a quantum adversary, the SPC protocol cannot be considered sound anymore. Since the focus is on quantum resistant blind registration of passwords with malicious participants, the SPC protocol is insufficient.
ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOFS IN LATTICE-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY. Early work on interactive and noninteractive proof systems [24, 43, 46] for lattices exploited the geometric structure of worst-case lattice problems, and are not generally applicable in lattice-based cryptography. More recent methods of proving relations appearing in lattice-based cryptosystems belong to the following two main families.
The first family, introduced by Lyubashevsky [40, 41] , uses "rejection sampling" techniques, and lead to relatively efficient proofs of knowledge of small secret vectors [9, 2, 13, 14] , and proofs of linear and multiplicative relations among committed values [10, 3] in the ideal lattice setting. However, due to the nature of "rejection sampling", there is a tiny probability that even an honest prover may fail to convince the verifier: i.e., protocols in this family do not have perfect completeness. Furthermore, when proving knowledge of vectors with norm bound β, the knowledge extractor of these protocols is only guaranteed to produce witnesses of norm bound g · β, for some factor g > 1. This factor, called "soundness slack" in [2, 13] , may be undesirable: if an extracted witness has to be used in the security proof to solve a challenge SIS instance, we need the SIS g·β assumption, which is stronger than the SIS β assumption required by the protocol itself. Moreover, in some sophisticated cryptographic constructions such as the zero-knowledge password policy check protocol considered in this work, the coordinates of extracted vectors are expected to be in {0, 1} and/or satisfy a specific pattern. Such issues seem hard to tackle using this family of protocols.
The second family, initiated by Ling et al. [37] , use "decomposition-extension" techniques in latticebased analogues [29] of Stern's protocol [50] . These are less efficient than those of the first family because each protocol execution admits a constant soundness error, and require repeating protocols ω(log n) times, for a security parameter n, to achieve negligible soundness error. On the upside, Stern-like protocols have perfect completeness and can handle a wide range of lattice-based relations [38, 36, 12, 34, 35, 39] , especially when witnesses have to not only be small or binary, but also certain prescribed arrangement of coordinates. Furthermore, unlike protocols of the first family, the extractor of Stern-like protocols can output witness vectors with the same properties expected of valid witnesses. This feature is often crucial in the design of advanced protocols involving ZK proofs. In addition, the "soundness slack" issue is completely avoided, so the hardness assumptions are kept "in place".
ORGANIZATION. In the next section, we define notations used in the paper and briefly describe the building blocks for our ZKPPC protocol. Following that, in Section 3, we instantiate the building blocks and ZKPPC protocol with lattices-based primitives. Finally, we summarize and conclude in Section 4.
Preliminaries
NOTATION. We assume all vectors are column vectors. A vector x with coordinates x 1 , . . . , x m is written as x = (x 1 , . . . , x m ). For simplicity, concatenation of x ∈ R k and y ∈ R m is denoted with (x y) ∈ R k+m . Column-wise concatenation of matrices A ∈ R n×k and B ∈ R n×m is denoted by [A | B] ∈ R n×(k+m) . If S is a finite set, then x $ ← − S means that x is chosen uniformly at random over S. For a positive integer n, [n] denotes the set {1, . . . , n} and negl(n) denotes a negligible function in n. The set of all permutations of n elements is denoted by S n . All logarithms are of base 2.
Some Lattice-Based Cryptographic Ingredients
We first recall the average-case problem SIS and its link to worst-case lattice problems. [1, 23] ). Given a uniformly random matrix A ∈ Z n×m q , find a non-zero vector x ∈ Z m such that x ∞ ≤ β and A · x = 0 mod q.
Definition 1 (SIS
The hardness of the SIS is guaranteed by the worst-case to average-case reduction from lattice problems. If m, β = poly(n), and q > β · O( √ n), then the SIS ∞ n,m,q,β problem is at least as hard as the worst-case lattice problem SIVP γ for some γ = β · O( √ nm) (see, e.g., [23, 42] ).
The KTX commitment scheme. In this work, we employ the SIS-based commitment scheme proposed by Kawachi, Tanaka and Xagawa [29] (KTX). The scheme, with two flavours, works with lattice parameter n, prime modulus q = O(n), and dimension m = 2n⌈log q⌉.
In the variant that commits t bits, for some fixed t = poly(n), the commitment key is (A, B)
To commit x ∈ {0, 1} t , one samples randomness r $ ← − {0, 1} m , and outputs the commitment c = A · x + B · r mod q. Then, to open c, one reveals x ∈ {0, 1} t and r ∈ {0, 1} m .
If there exists two valid openings (x 1 , r 1 ) and (x 2 , r 2 ) for the same commitment c and x 1 = x 2 , then one can compute a solution to the SIS ∞ n,m+t,q,1 problem associated with the uniformly random matrix
. On the other hand, by the left-over hash lemma [48] , the distribution of a valid commitment c is statistically close to uniform over Z n q which implies that it is statistically hiding. Kawachi et al. [29] extended the above t-bit commitment scheme to a string commitment scheme COM : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} m → Z n q . The extended scheme shares the same characteristics, statistically hiding from the parameters set and computationally binding under the SIS assumption.
In this work, we use the former variant to commit to passwords, and use COM as a building block for Stern-like zero-knowledge protocols.
Zero-Knowledge Argument Systems and Stern-like Protocols
We work with statistical zero-knowledge argument systems, interactive protocols where the zero-knowledge property holds against any cheating verifier and the soundness property holds against computationally bounded cheating provers. More formally, let the set of statements-witnesses R = {(y, w)} ∈ {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * be an NP relation. A two-party game P, V is called an interactive argument system for the relation R with soundness error e if two conditions hold:
Here and henceforth, PPT denotes probabilistic polynomial time. An argument system is statistical zeroknowledge if for any V(y), there exists a PPT simulator S(y) which produces a simulated transcript that is statistically close to that of the real interaction between P(y, w) and V(y). A related notion is argument of knowledge, which requires the witness-extended emulation property. For 3 move protocols (i.e., commitment-challenge-response), witness-extended emulation is implied by special soundness [25] , which assumes the existence of a PPT extractor, taking as input a set of valid transcripts with respect to all possible values of the "challenge" to the same "commitment", and returning w ′ such that (y, w ′ ) ∈ R. Stern-like protocols. The statistical zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge presented in this work are Stern-like [50] protocols. In particular, they are Σ-protocols as defined in [27, 9] , where 3 valid transcripts are needed for extraction instead of just 2. Stern's protocol was originally proposed for code-based cryptography, and adapted to lattices by Kawachi et al. [29] . It was subsequently empowered by Ling et al. [37] to handle the matrix-vector relations associated with the SIS and inhomogeneous SIS problems and extended to design several lattice-based schemes: group signatures [38, 36, 34, 39] , policy-based signatures [12] and group encryption [35] . The basic protocol has 3 moves. With COM, the KTX string commitment scheme [29] , we get a statistical zero-knowledge argument of knowledge (ZKAoK) with perfect completeness, constant soundness error 2/3, and communication cost O(|w| · log q), where |w| is the total bit-size of the secret vectors.
An abstraction of Stern's protocol. We recall an abstraction of Stern's protocol, proposed in [34] . Let n, ℓ, q be positive integers, where ℓ ≥ n, q ≥ 2, and VALID be a subset of {0, 1} ℓ . Suppose S is a finite set and every φ ∈ S is associated with a permutation Γ φ of ℓ elements, satisfying the following conditions:
If w ∈ VALID and φ is uniform in S, then Γ φ (w) is uniform in VALID.
(1)
We aim to construct a statistical ZKAoK for the following abstract relation:
Stern's original protocol has VALID = {w ∈ {0, 1} ℓ : wt(w) = k}, where wt(·) denotes the Hamming weight and k < ℓ for some given k, S = S ℓ -the symmetric group on ℓ elements, and Γ φ (w) = φ(w).
The conditions in (1) are key to prove that w ∈ VALID in ZK: The prover P samples φ $ ← − S and the verifier V checks that Γ φ (w) ∈ VALID; no additional information about w is revealed to V due to the randomness of φ. Furthermore, to prove in ZK that M · w = v mod q holds, P samples r w $ ← − Z ℓ q to mask w, and convinces V instead that M · (w + r w ) = M · r w + v mod q.
We describe the interaction between P and V in Figure 1 . A statistically hiding and computationally binding string commitment scheme COM, e.g. the scheme in Section 2.1, is used.
← − S and randomness ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 for COM. Then, a commitment CMT = C1, C2, C3 is sent to the verifier V, where
2.
Challenge: V sends a challenge Ch $ ← − {1, 2, 3} to P.
3.
Response: Based on Ch, P sends RSP computed as follows:
, and RSP = (tw, tr, ρ2, ρ3).
-Ch = 2: Let φ2 = φ, w2 = w + rw mod q, and RSP = (φ2, w2, ρ1, ρ3).
-Ch = 3: Let φ3 = φ, w3 = rw, and RSP = (φ3, w3, ρ1, ρ2).
Verification: Receiving RSP, V proceeds as follows:
-Ch = 1: Check that tw ∈ VALID, C2 = COM(tr; ρ2), C3 = COM(tw + tr mod q; ρ3).
-Ch = 2: Check that C1 = COM(φ2, M · w2 − v mod q; ρ1), C3 = COM(Γ φ 2 (w2); ρ3).
-Ch = 3: Check that C1 = COM(φ3, M · w3; ρ1), C2 = COM(Γ φ 3 (w3); ρ2).
In each case, V outputs 1 if and only if all the conditions hold. The proof of the Theorem 1, which appeared in [34] , employs standard simulation and extraction techniques for Stern-like protocols [29, 37] . The proof is provided in Appendix A for the sake of completeness.
Password Strings and Password Policies
Next, we present the models of password strings and policies, adapted from [31] . Password Strings. We consider password strings pw over the set of 94 printable characters Σ all in the ASCII alphabet Σ ASCII , where We denote by Dict a general dictionary containing all strings that can be formed from the characters in Σ all . A password string pw = (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c k ) ∈ Σ k all ⊂ Dict of length k is an ordered multi-set of characters
contain at least one digit, one symbol, one lower-case and one upper-case letters. 2. Policy f = (0, 2, 0, 1), 10, 14 demands that password strings must be between 10 and 14 characters, including at least two symbols and one upper-case letter.
Remark 1.
In practice, password policies typically do not specify n max but we can simply fix a number that upper-bounds all reasonable password lengths.
Randomised Password Hashing and Zero-Knowledge Password Policy Check
We now recall the notions of randomised password hashing and zero-knowledge password policy check. Our presentation follows [31, 30] . Randomised Password Hashing. This mechanism aims to compute some password verification information that can be used later in more advanced protocols (e.g., ZKPPC and VPAKE). In order to prevent off-line dictionary attacks, the computation process is randomised via a pre-hash salt and hash salt. More formally, a randomised password hashing scheme H is a tuple of 5 algorithms H = (Setup, PreSalt, PreHash, Salt, Hash), defined as follows.
-Setup(λ): On input security parameter λ, generate public parameters pp, including the descriptions of the salt spaces S P and S H . -PreSalt(pp): On input pp, output a random pre-hash salt s P ∈ S P . -PreHash(pp, pw, s P ): On input pp, password pw and pre-hash salt s P , output a pre-hash value P .
-Salt(pp): On input pp, output a random hash salt s H ∈ S H . -Hash(pp, P, s P , s H ): On input pp, pre-hash value P , pre-hash salt s P and hash salt s H , output a hash value h.
A secure randomised password hashing scheme H must satisfy 5 requirements: pre-image resistance, second pre-image resistance, pre-hash entropy preservation, entropy preservation and password hiding.
-Pre-image resistance (or tight one-wayness in [11] ): Let pp ← Setup(λ) and Dict be a dictionary of min-entropy β. Hash(·) is a function such that (H i , s H i ) ← Hash(·), where s H i ← Salt(pp) and H i ← Hash(pp, P i , s P i , s H i ). P i ← PreHash(pp, pw i , s P i ) with s P i ← PreSalt(pp) and pw i $ ← − Dict. P i is stored by Hash(·) and there is a function Verify(i, P ) such that Verify(i, P ) = 1 if P = P i .
For all PPT adversaries A running in time at most t, there exists a negligible function ε(·) such that
for small α and t PreHash , the running time of PreHash. -Second pre-image resistance: For all PPT adversaries A, there exists a negligible function ε(·) such that for P ′ ← A(pp, P, s H ),
where pp ← Setup(λ), s P ← PreSalt(pp), s H ← Salt(pp) and P ← Hash(pp, pw, s P ) for any pw ∈ Dict.
-Pre-hash entropy preservation: For all dictionaries Dict that are samplable in polynomial time with min-entropy β and any PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function ε(·) such that for (P, s P ) ← A(pp) with pp ← Setup(λ) and random password pw
-Entropy preservation: For all min-entropy β polynomial-time samplable dictionaries Dict and any PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function ε(·) such that for (H, s P , s H ) ← A(pp)
where pp ← Setup(λ) and pw $ ← − Dict.
-Password hiding: For all PPT adversaries A = (A 1 , A 2 ), where A 1 (pp) outputs two equal length passwords pw 0 , pw 1 for pp ← Setup(λ) and A 2 (H) outputs a bit b ′ for H ← Hash(pp, P, s P , s H ),
where s H ← Salt(λ), s P ← PreSalt(λ) and P ← PreHash(pp, pw b , s P ) for a random bit b $ ← − {0, 1}, there exists a negligible function ε(·) such that
Zero-Knowledge Password Policy Check. Let H = (Setup, PreSalt, PreHash, Salt, Hash) be a randomised password hashing scheme. A password policy check (PPC) is an interactive protocol between a client and server where the password policy
, n min , n max of the server and public parameters pp ← Setup(λ) are used as common inputs. At the end of the execution, the server accepts a hash value h of any password pw of the client's choice if and only if f (pw) = true. A PPC protocol is an argument of knowledge of the password pw and ssrandomness s P ← PreSalt(pp), s H ← Salt(pp) used for hashing. To prevent leaking the password to the server, one additionally requires that the protocol be zero-knowledge. More formally, a zero-knowledge PPC protocol is an interactive protocol between a prover (client) and verifier (server), in which, given (pp, f, h) the former convinces the later in zero-knowledge that the former knows pw and randomness (s P , s H ) such that:
f (pw) = true and Hash(pp, P, s P , s H ) = h, where P ← PreHash(pp, pw, s P ).
Our Constructions
To construct randomised password hashing schemes and ZKPPC protocols from concrete computational assumptions, the first challenge is to derive a password encoding mechanism that operates securely and interacts smoothly with the hashing and zero-knowledge layers. In the discrete log setting considered in [31] , passwords are mapped to large integers and then encoded as elements in a group of large order. Unfortunately, this does not translate well to the lattice setting as working with large-norm objects usually reduces the security and efficiency of the construction. Therefore, a different method, which encodes passwords as small-norm objects, is desirable. In this work, we will therefore use binary vectors. Let bin(·) be the function that maps non-negative integers to their binary decomposition. For any character c encoded in ASCII, let ASCII(c) ∈ [0, 255] be its code. Then, we define enc(c) for an ASCII encoded character c and enc(pw) for some length-t password pw = (c 1 , . . . , c t ) ∈ Σ t as enc(c) = bin(ASCII(c)) ∈ {0, 1} 8 ,
Notations, Sets and Permutations
Let m, n be arbitrary positive integers. We define the following sets and permutations:
⋄ B 2 m : the set of all vectors in {0, 1} 2m whose Hamming weight is exactly m. Note that for x ∈ Z 2m and ψ ∈ S 2m the following holds:
⋄ T ψ,n , for ψ ∈ S m : the permutation that, when applied to a vector v = (v 1 v 2 . . . v m ) ∈ Z nm , consisting of m blocks of size n, re-arranges the blocks of v according to ψ, as follows,
For convenience, when working with password alphabet
, n min , n max , we introduce the following notations and sets: (1), . . . , bin(n max ) .
Observe that the following properties hold.
⋄ For all α ∈ {D, S, L, U, all}, all x ∈ Z 8ηα and all ψ ∈ S ηα :
x ∈ SET α and ψ
⋄ For all x ∈ Z nmax⌈log nmax⌉ and all ψ ∈ S nmax :
x ∈ SET nmax ⇔ T ψ,⌈log nmax⌉ (x) ∈ x ∈ SET nmax ;
x ∈ SET nmax and ψ $ ← − S nmax , then T ψ,⌈log nmax⌉ (x) is uniform over SET nmax .
Randomised Password Hashing from Lattices
We describe our randomised password hashing scheme L for passwords of length between two given integers n min and n max . At a high level, our scheme maps characters of the password pw to binary block vectors, rearranges them with a random permutation χ, and finally computes the password hash as a KTX commitment ( [29] , see also Section 2.1) to a vector storing all the information on pw and χ. The scheme works as follows,
L.Setup(λ).
On input security parameter λ, the algorithm performs the following steps:
1. Choose parameters n = O(λ), prime modulus q = O(n), and dimension m = 2n⌈log q⌉.
Sample matrices
3. Let the pre-hash salt space be S P = S nmax -the set of all permutations of n max elements, and hash salt space be S H = {0, 1} m .
Output the public parameters pp
L.PreSalt(pp). Sample χ $ ← − S nmax and output s P = χ.
L.PreHash(pp, pw, s P ). Let s P = χ ∈ S nmax and t ∈ [n min , n max ] be the length of password pw. The pre-hash value P is computed as follows.
1. Compute encode(pw) ∈ {0, 1} 8t , consisting of t blocks of length 8.
2. Insert n max − t blocks of length 8, each one being enc(g) for some non-printable ASCII character g ∈ Σ ASCII \ Σ all , into the block-vector encode(pw) to get e ∈ {0, 1} 8nmax . 1 3. Apply T χ, 8 to get e ′ = T χ,8 (e) ∈ {0, 1} 8nmax .
Output the pre-hash value
L.Hash(pp, P, s P , s H ). Let P = e ′ ∈ {0, 1} 8nmax , s P = χ ∈ S nmax and s H = r ∈ {0, 1} m . The hash value h is computed as follows,
2. Form x = (e 0 e ′ ) ∈ {0, 1} nmax ⌈log nmax⌉+8nmax and output h = A · x + B · r ∈ Z n q .
In the following theorem, we demonstrate that the proposed scheme satisfies the security requirements defined in Section 2.4.
Theorem 2.
Under the SIS assumption, the randomised password hashing scheme, L, described above satisfies 5 requirements: pre-image resistance, second pre-image resistance, pre-hash entropy preservation, entropy preservation and password hiding.
Proof. First, we remark that, by construction, if the pre-hash salt s P = χ is given, then we can reverse the procedure used to extend the length t password by simply discarding any non-printable characters after applying the inverse of the permutation specified by s P . Hence, if s P is hidden, then due to its randomness, the min-entropy of P is larger than the min-entropy of pw. Thus, the proposed hashing scheme has the pre-hash entropy preservation and entropy preservation properties.
Next, note that h = A · x + B · r mod q is a proper KTX commitment of message x with randomness r. Thus, from the statistical hiding property of the commitment scheme, the password hiding property holds.
Furthermore, if one can produce distinct pre-hash values P , P ′ that yield the same hash value h, then one can use these values to break the computational binding property of the KTX commitment scheme. This implies that second pre-image resistance property holds under the SIS assumption.
Finally, over the randomness of matrix A, password pw and pre-hash salt s P , except for a negligible probability (i.e., in the event one accidentally finds a solution to the SIS problem associated with matrix A), vector A · x accepts at least 2 β values in Z n q , where β is the min-entropy of the dictionary Dict from which pw is chosen. Therefore, even if A · x = h − B · s H mod q is given, to find P = e ′ , one has to perform 2 β invocations of PreHash which implies that the scheme satisfies the pre-image resistance property. ⊓ ⊔
Techniques for Proving Set Membership
In our construction of ZKPPC in Section 3.4, we will have to prove that a linear relation of the form i public matrix M i · binary secret vector s i = h mod q holds, where each secret vector s i must be an element of a given set of relatively small cardinality, e.g.,
Thus, we need to design suitable sub-protocols to prove set membership. In the lattice-based world, a set membership argument system with logarithmic complexity in the cardinality of the set was proposed in [36] , exploiting Stern-like protocols and Merkle hash trees. Despite its asymptotic efficiency, the actual efficiency is worse when the underlying set has small, constant size. To tackle the problems encountered here, we employ a different approach, which has linear complexity but is technically simpler and practically more efficient.
Suppose we have to prove that an n-dimensional vector s i belongs to a set of m vectors {v 1 , . . . , v m }. To this end, we append m−1 blocks to vector s i to get an nm-dimensional vector s ⋆ i whose m blocks are exactly elements of the set {v 1 , . . . , v m }. At the same time, we append n(m − 1) zero-columns to public matrix
, so that we preserve the linear equation under consideration. In this way, we reduce the set-membership problem to the problem of proving the well-formedness of s ⋆ i . The latter can be done via random permutations of blocks in the framework of Stern's protocol. For instance, to prove that s i ∈ Enc D , i.e., s i is a correct binary encoding of a digit, we extend it to s ⋆ i ∈ SET D , apply a random permutation to the extended vector, and make use of the properties observed in (3).
Zero-Knowledge Password Policy Check Protocol
We now present our construction of ZKPPC from lattices. Throughout, we use notations, sets and permutation techniques specified in Section 3.1 to reduce the statement to be proved to an instance of the relation R abstract considered in Section 2.2, which in turn can be handled by the Stern-like protocol of Figure 1 .
Our protocol allows a prover P to convince a verifier V in ZK that P knows a password pw that hashes to a given value with randomness χ, r, and satisfies some policy f = (k D , k U , k L , k S ), n min , n max . 2 Recall that V demands pw must have length between n min and n max inclusive, contain at least k D digits, k S symbols, k L lower-case and k U upper-case letters. For simplicity, we let
The common input consists of matrices A ∈ Z n×(nmax⌈log nmax⌉+8nmax) q , B ∈ Z n×m q , hash value h ∈ Z n q and extra information
which indicates the positions of the blocks, inside vector P = e ′ , encoding k D digits, k S symbols, k L lowercase letters, k U upper-case letters and k all other printable characters within pw. Revealing ∆ to V does not harm P, since the original positions of those blocks (in vector e) are protected by the secret permutation χ. The prover's witness consists of vectors x = (e 0 e ′ ) ∈ {0, 1} nmax ⌈log nmax⌉+8nmax and r ∈ {0, 1} m satisfying the following conditions:
2. e 0 = bin(χ (1) − 1) . . . bin(χ(n max − 1)) ; 3. e ′ has the form (x 1 , . . . , x nmax ), where, for all α ∈ {D, S, L, U, all} and all i ∈ [k α ], it holds that
We first observe that, if we express matrix A as
and A 1 , . . . , A nmax ∈ Z n×8 q , then equation A · x + B · r = h mod q can be equivalently written as
Note that, we have e 0 ∈ SET nmax . We next transform the witness vectors x 1 , . . . , x nmax , r as follows, ⋄ For all α ∈ {D, S, L, U, all} and all i ∈ [k α ], to prove that x δ α,i ∈ Enc α , we append η α − 1 suitable blocks to x δ α,i to get vector x ⋆ δ α,i ∈ SET α .
⋄ For vectors {x j } j∈[nmax]\∆ , note that it is necessary and sufficient to prove that they are binary vectors (namely, they are encoding of characters that may or may not be printable). Similarly, we have to prove that r is a binary vector. To this end, we let y ∈ {0, 1} 8(nmax −n min ) be a concatenation of all {x j } j∈[nmax]\∆ and z = (y r) ∈ {0, 1} 8(nmax −n min )+m . Then, we append suitable binary entries to z to get z ⋆ ∈ {0, 1} 2(8(nmax −n min )+m) with Hamming weight exactly 8(n max − n min ) + m, i.e., z ⋆ ∈ B 2 8(nmax−n min )+m .
Having performed the above transformations, we construct the vector w ∈ {0, 1} ℓ , where
and w has the form: Proof. Perfect completeness, soundness error 2/3 and communication cost O(ℓ log q) of the protocol follow from the use of the abstract protocol in Figure 1 . For simulation, we simply run the simulator of Theorem 1.
As for knowledge extraction, we first run the knowledge extractor of Theorem 1 to get the vector w ′ ∈ VALID such that M · w ′ = v mod q. Then, we "backtrack" the transformations to extract from w ′ , vectors
, 1} nmax ⌈log nmax⌉+8nmax and r ′ ∈ {0, 1} m such that
Notice that one can recover a permutation of n max elements from an element of SET nmax . Let χ ′ be the permutation encoded by e ′ 0 . Then, by applying the inverse permutation T −1
we recover e ′ ∈ {0, 1} 8nmax . Finally, by removing potential blocks of length 8 that correspond to encodings of nonprintable ASCII characters from e ′ , we obtain a vector that encodes some password string pw ′ satisfying policy f .
⊓ ⊔ Efficiency analysis. By inspection, we can see that, without using the big-O notation, each round of the proposed protocol has communication cost slightly larger than
Let us estimate the cost in practice. Note that the KTX commitment scheme can work with relatively small lattice parameters, e.g., n = 256, log q = 10, m = 5120. For a common password policy f = (1, 1, 1, 1), 8, 16 , the communication cost would be about 17 KB. As each round has a soundness error of 2/3, one may have to repeat the protocol many times in parallel to achieve a high level of confidence. For instance, if a soundness error of 2 −30 is required, then one can repeat 52 times for a final cost of around 900 KB. In practical implementations, one can exploit various optimizations (e.g., instead of sending a random vector, one can send the PRNG seed used to generate it) to reduce the communication complexity.
Conclusion and Open Questions
Through the use of the KTX commitment scheme [29] and a Stern-like zero-knowledge argument of set membership, we designed a lattice-based zero-knowledge protocol for proving that a committed/hashed password sent to the server satisfies the required password policy. All together, we obtain the first ZKPPC that is based on the hardness of the SIS problem which to date remains quantum resistant. Unfortunately, there are no viable VPAKE protocols from lattices that can be coupled with our ZKPPC protocol to construct a complete privacy-preserving password-based authentication and key exchange system.
Our proposed ZKPPC protocol can be employed to securely register chosen passwords at remote servers with the following security guarantees: (1) Registered passwords are not disclosed to the server until used; (2) Each registered password provably conforms to the specified password policy. Although not being ready to be deployed in practice, we view this work as the first step in designing post-quantum privacy-preserving password-based authentication and key exchange systems.
We leave several open questions as potential future work: (1) to construct a more practical lattice-based ZKPPC; (2) to develop a lattice-based VPAKE; and (3) to extend lattice-based ZKPPC to other PAKE protocols, such as two-server PAKE, where the passwords are secretly shared between two servers, of which we assume at most one to be compromisable. The third question is similar to the one asked by Kiefer and Manulis [31] and as they noted, it is a challenge even in the classical discrete logarithm setting.
A Proof of Theorem 1
We provide the proof of Theorem 1 as it appears in [34] but first restate the theorem. Theorem 1. The protocol in Figure 1 Proof. Perfect completeness of the protocol can be checked: If a prover follows the protocol honestly, the verifier will always accept. It is also easy to see that the communication cost is bounded by O(ℓ log q).
We now prove that the protocol is a statistical zero-knowledge argument of knowledge. Zero-Knowledge Property. We construct a PPT simulator SIM interacting with a (possibly dishonest) verifier V, such that, given only the public inputs, with probability negligibly close to 2/3, SIM outputs a simulated transcript that is statistically close to the one produced by the honest prover in the real interaction.
SIM first chooses uniformly at random, Ch ∈ {1, 2, 3}, its prediction of Ch that V will not choose. Case Ch = 1: Using basic linear algebra over Z q , SIM computes a vector w ′ ∈ Z ℓ q such that M · w ′ = v mod q. Receiving a challenge Ch from V, the simulator responds as follows:
-If Ch = 1: Send RSP = Γ φ (w ′ ), Γ φ (r w ), ρ 2 , ρ 3 .
-If Ch = 2: Output ⊥ and abort.
-If Ch = 3: Send RSP = φ, r w , ρ 1 , ρ 2 .
Case Ch = 3: SIM samples w ′ $ ← − VALID, r w $ ← − Z ℓ q , φ $ ← − S, and randomness ρ 1 , ρ 2 , ρ 3 for COM. Then, it sends the commitment CMT = C ′ 1 , C ′ 2 , C ′ 3 to V, where C ′ 2 = COM(Γ φ (r w ); ρ 2 ), C ′ 3 = COM(Γ φ (w ′ + r w ); ρ 3 ) as in the previous two cases, while
Receiving a challenge Ch from V, it responds as follows:
-If Ch = 1: Send RSP computed as in the case (Ch = 2, Ch = 1).
-If Ch = 2: Send RSP computed as in the case (Ch = 1, Ch = 2).
-If Ch = 3: Output ⊥ and abort.
Observe that, in each of the cases considered above, since COM is statistically hiding, the distribution of the commitment CMT and challenge Ch from V are statistically close to those in the real interaction. Hence, the probability that the simulator outputs ⊥ is negligibly close to 1/3. Moreover, one can check that whenever the simulator does not halt, it will provide an accepted transcript, the distribution of which is statistically close to the prover's in the real interaction. In other words, the constructed simulator can successfully impersonate the honest prover with probability negligibly close to 2/3.
Argument of Knowledge. Suppose RSP 1 = (t w , t r , ρ 2 , ρ 3 ), RSP 2 = (φ 2 , w 2 , ρ 1 , ρ 3 ) and RSP 3 = (φ 3 , w 3 , ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) are 3 valid responses to the same commitment CMT = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ), with respect to all 3 possible values of the challenge. The validity of these responses implies that:            t w ∈ VALID; C 1 = COM(φ 2 , M · w 2 − v mod q; ρ 1 ) = COM(φ 3 , M · w 3 ; ρ 1 ); C 2 = COM(t r ; ρ 2 ) = COM(Γ φ 3 (w 3 ); ρ 2 ); C 3 = COM(t w + t r mod q; ρ 3 ) = COM(Γ φ 2 (w 2 ); ρ 3 ).
Since COM is computationally binding, it implies that t w ∈ VALID; φ 2 = φ 3 ; t r = Γ φ 3 (w 3 ); t w + t r = Γ φ 2 (w 2 ) mod q;
Since t w ∈ VALID, if we let w ′ = [Γ φ 2 ] −1 (t w ), then w ′ ∈ VALID. Furthermore, we have Γ φ 2 (w ′ ) + Γ φ 2 (w 3 ) = Γ φ 2 (w 2 ) mod q, which means that w ′ + w 3 = w 2 mod q, and M · w ′ + M · w 3 = M · w 2 mod q. As a result, we have M · w ′ = v mod q, concluding the proof. ⊓ ⊔
